Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
With an increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, progressive inheritance or estate taxes have been repeatedly proposed as an antidote to the perpetuation of wealth inequality [Piketty and Saez 2013 , Piketty 2014 , Piketty 2015 ]. 1 However, besides the potential to ameliorate equity, wealth transfer taxes might impose efficiency costs on the economy by reducing the incentives to work or save. They also could lead to tax evasion or avoidance, reducing the usefulness of taxation in counteracting wealth inequality. A major element of making progress in the discussion on the role of wealth transfer taxation is thus understanding the impact of taxes on individuals' behaviors. However, to date, there is still a lack of reliable analysis of behavioral responses due practical difficulties that limit empirical work [Kopczuk 2013 ]. It is not only that exogenous variation in tax rates is rarely available but also that wealth transfer data are hard to find. Behavioral responses to wealth transfer taxation are, therefore, not well understood.
The present paper illuminates individuals' behavioral responses considering the German inheritance and inter vivos gift tax. Two key features render the German setting well suited to spotlight novel and valuable insights: first, the progressive tax introduces large jumps in the marginal tax rates at taxable wealth transfer cutoffs, creating strong bunching incentives. Those kinks in individuals' budget constraints allow for non-parametric identification of behavioral responses using a bunching approach [Saez 2010 , Chetty et al. 2011 , Kleven and Waseem 2013 . The substantial size of the kinks makes the analysis especially valuable. That is because taxpayers unlikely ignore large changes in tax rates and, therefore, estimates of behavioral responses are less likely downward biased [Chetty 2012 ]. Second, the rich administrative data available in Germany covers the universe of tax assessments for each year. This implies that the data contain a large number of very prosperous individuals who play an important role in the overall distributional implications of taxation.
The behavioral parameter of interest in this paper is the compensated elasticity of reported taxable transfers with respect to the net-of-tax rate. This is a broad measure of behavioral responses, reflecting the reactions of different 1 Piketty et al. argue that when the economy's growth rate is smaller than the rate of return to capital, wealth becomes highly concentrated, and inheritances play an important role in wealth accumulation. Transfer taxes then mechanically reduce the rate of return net-of-taxes and build a counteracting force to inequality. Auerbach and Hassett [2015] , Mankiw [2015] , and Weil [2015] have criticized this main conclusion. actors (donors, donees) along a multiplicity of margins (real responses, nonreal responses). 2 Conceptually, this tax base elasticity is not only of paramount importance to quantify the marginal welfare costs of taxation [Feldstein 1995 , Feldstein 1999 , Kopczuk 2013 , but it is also crucial for determining optimal tax rates [Piketty and Saez 2013] . 3 We present three sets of empirical findings. The first set of findings relates to the bunching of taxable inheritances at a large convex kink point. Bunching is noticeable and sharp for transfers between close relatives, but is not statistically significant for other relatives and unrelated individuals. Precisely, close relatives reduce taxable transfers by approximately 1.7% in response to an increase in the marginal tax rate; the underlying elasticity of 0.03 is small. This highlights the fundamental design issue with large wealth transfer kinks: even with small elasticities, large kinks can trigger substantial behavioral responses.
The second set of findings is derived from studying different types of wealth transfers at death. When making their will, testators can choose between proportional inheritances (heir inherits a proportion of the total estate) and pure predefined inheritances (heir inherits specific items of the estate but no proportion). If taxes are tied to a proportion of the total estate at death, responses to the tax schedule are weak and statistically insignificant. This result is in line with the notion that if the lifetime is uncertain, the estate at death is difficult to plan [Yaari 1965 , Hurd 1989 , Friedman and Warshawsky 1990 , Mitchell et al. 1999 , Kopczuk 2013 . As a consequence, proportional inheritances are at least partially accidental at the intensive margin, making responses to the tax schedule less likely. If the value of the wealth transfer is instead certain before death, as for predefined inheritances, individuals are capable of responding. Indeed, we document a large behavioral response of taxable predefined inheritances.
The estimated reduction of taxable predefined inheritances is 6.1%, implying an underlying elasticity of 0.11. Because of the pervasive use of proportional inheritances, the overall elasticity is small.
Our third set of findings emerges from examining the effects of taxation on taxable inter vivos gifts. The analysis reveals that there is again heterogeneity in the estimates. The elasticity of taxable gifts for close relatives amounts to 0.07 and for other relatives to 0.02. In contrast, there is no significant bunching for unrelated individuals. It is not surprising that the elasticities of taxable gifts are larger than those of taxable inheritances: similar to predefined inheritances, gifts do not involve uncertainty over wealth transfers. Besides, because gifts offer tax avoidance opportunities, individuals who transfer wealth inter vivos might be a selective sample of responsive types.
In a nutshell, this paper lends strong support to the hypothesis that wealth transfers are relatively inelastic along the intensive margin. Because we study taxable transfer elasticities, which also include tax avoidance and tax evasion responses, this main conclusion is particularly strong. However, the observed behavioral responses are of short-term nature due to the fact that tax schedules are only valid for a limited period. In the long term, behavioral responses to taxes are likely larger than in the short term, not only because individuals have more time to adjust taxable transfers but also because tax avoidance opportunities are higher. Furthermore, frictions such as inattention or adjustment costs should play a minor role in the long term. The bunching approach also does not capture extensive responses. Therefore, we cannot claim that wealth transfer taxes are in general without any distortions.
Behavioral responses to wealth transfer taxes are understudied in the empirical public finance literature, and this paper contributes to closing this gap.
A first small body of literature has studied the question of how taxation affects bequests. Kopczuk [2009] points out that while this question is straightforward to ask, it is particularly difficult to answer, as establishing a causal link between tax rates and bequests is an arduous task. Nevertheless, some earlier work from the US has taken up this challenge [Holtz-Eakin and Marples 2001 , Slemrod and Kopczuk 2001 , Joulfaian 2006 ]. 4 Remarkably, even though these articles applied different empirical methods, they all report similar estimates of estate or wealth elasticities with respect to the net-of-tax rate ranging from 0.1 to 0.2.
More recently, two contributions made further progress in overcoming the identification issues [Jappelli et al. 2014; Goupille and Infante 2014] . In contrast to this paper, both studies focused on the responsiveness of specific assets of the estate instead of on inheritances.
A second body of empirical literature focuses on the effect of taxation on giving while alive [McGarry 2001 , Poterba 2001 , Page 2003 , Joulfaian 2004 , Joulfaian and McGarry 2004 , Joulfaian 2005 , Ohlsson 2011 ]. This part of the literature has mainly come to the conclusion that gifts are more responsive than estates but at the same time are underused as a tax planning instrument. The main contribution of this paper is twofold: first, we estimate a broader set of responses (inheritances, inter vivos gifts) in an integrated framework. Second, we exploit extensive administrative data and rich quasi-experimental variation. This helps to overcome the identification problem.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the institutional context and the data, section 3 presents our conceptual framework and the estimation strategy, section 4 reports the empirical results, and section 5 concludes the paper.
The German Inheritance and Gift Tax

Institutional Framework
This section highlights the main characteristics of the German wealth transfer tax, referring to tax years 1996-2002. The tax applies to transfers of wealth at death and inter vivos gifts. Taxation of transfers of wealth at death takes the form of an inheritance tax. This means that the tax base is defined at the level of the heir and mirrors the taxable inheritance a particular donee receives. More formally, the taxable inheritance of heir i is
where E is the estate, D is the debt of decedent's estate, α i is i's share of the estate net-of-debt, P i are predefined assets or liabilities that donee i inherits, G i are inter vivos gifts that heir i has received from the same testator within the last ten years, and X i are tax exemptions. 5 Equation (1) What is crucial for this paper is that the tax schedules feature jumps in the marginal tax rates, creating a source of quasi-experimental variation in tax incentives. Panel A of Figure 1 shows the tax liability as a function of the taxable transfer in Deutsche Mark (DM) for close relatives. 8 Within each tax bracket, the tax liability is a percentage of the taxable transfer. To be precise, the statutory tax rate is 7% up to the bracket cutoff at 100,000 DM and 11% above. Therefore, without additional regulations, the tax liability would discretely increase at the cutoff, i.e., there would be a notch at the threshold (see Panel A). Increasing taxable transfers by one Deutsche Mark at the threshold would raise the tax liability from 7,000 DM to approximately 11,000 DM. However, the tax code smooths the transition between brackets. Taxable transfers above the threshold are subject to a substantially higher marginal tax rate, replacing the notch in the tax liability with a large convex kink (see dashed blue line). Above some taxable transfer level, however, taxes are lower when calculating them as a percentage of taxable transfers using the second tax bracket's statutory tax rate. Hence, the second tax bracket effectively begins at this second cutoff, introducing a substantial concave kink. We label the range between both cutoffs the transition area. Panel B of Figure 1 illustrates the underlying jumps in the marginal tax rates for all tax classes, delivering the quasi-experimental variation we exploit for identification.
The following additional features of the tax schedules are important to note.
First, taxation favors transfers within families. Aside from the transition area, the marginal tax rates for close relatives (bracket 1: 7%, transition area: 50%, bracket 2: 11%) are lower than the rates that apply to other relatives (12%, 50%, 17%) and to unrelated individuals (17%, 50%, 23%). The tax exemptions for close relatives are also the highest. Second, the marginal tax rate changes are substantial. For close relatives, the marginal tax rate increases by 43 percentage 6 See the notes of Table A2 in the Appendix for a detailed description of the tax classes. 7 Thereby, we account for approximately one-third of total tax revenues. See Table A2 as well as Figure A1 in the Appendix for a description of the full tax schedules. 8 The exchange rates in 2002 was 1 USD = 2.2469 DM. points (p.p.) at the convex kink. The corresponding value for other relatives (unrelated individuals) is 38 p.p. (33 p.p.). Third, while the tax code explicitly states the location of the convex kink point, the location of the concave kink point must be calculated using a complicated formula. 9 The salience of the convex kink is thus much higher than the salience of the concave kink.
Turning to the tax assessment, donees have the obligation to inform the German tax authorities within three months of any wealth transfer they have received. The enforcement system additionally includes third-party reporting:
registry offices, courts, local authorities, notaries, and financial institutions report all information relevant for the tax assessment to the tax authorities. If the tax authorities infer from the received information that the transferred wealth likely exceeds the tax exemptions, they request that donees file a tax return.
Given the upfront information transmitted to the tax authorities, enforcement of taxes is powerful.
Comparing the incentives to bequest with those to give, we might note that although inheritances and gifts are assessed and taxed under the same rules taxation is in fact a disincentive to leave bequests. Donors can use personal tax exemptions every ten years to transfer wealth tax-free. Furthermore, the instruments to enforce transfers at death are more powerful: the German tax law imposes freezing of all assets after a person dies, and heirs need an official certificate of inheritance or a power of attorney to claim assets, hampering misreporting possibilities.
Data
The study draws on administrative data from the German Federal Statistical Office, including the universe of transfers for which a tax assessment has been done in 2002. 10 The tax statistic includes detailed transfer-specific information on all characteristics relevant for the assessment of taxes. In our analysis, we focus on the first two tax brackets. The corresponding sample consists of 21,927 gifts and 99,804 inheritances for 47,644 communities of heirs. 11 Table 1 decomposes taxable transfers into its components and presents summary statistics.
Several aspects of the sample are worth noting. First, the universe of tax 9 Denoting by b * 1 the location of the convex kink, by b * 2 the location of the concave kink, by t 0 the marginal tax rate in the first bracket, by t 1 the marginal tax rate in the transition area, and by t 2 the marginal tax rate in the second bracket, the location of the concave kink is b * 2 = b * 1 · t 1 −t 0 t 1 −t 2 . 10 Tax assessments cover transfers realized between 1996 and 2002. 11 Because the tax schedules changed slightly in 2002, we exclude this year from the analysis. assessments does not overlap with the universe of transfers due to the tax exemptions. Second, the population of tax filers included in the data is a wealthy subsample of the total population because the exemptions are very high. 12 Third, in 62% of all cases, wealth is transferred between close or other relatives. Fourth, the inheritance and gift subsamples differ highly in nature. For example, while business assets and real estate account for 71% of total gifts, total inheritances consist of 61% of other assets, such as bank deposits, insurance benefits, or equity shares. Fifth, considering the inheritance sample, only every fourth heir receives predefined inheritances.
Conceptual Framework and Empirical Approach
Conceptual Framework
We now outline a simple theory that creates the basis for our bunching estimation approach. Consider a standard static donor-donee framework. A donor has strictly quasi-concave preferences and not only cares about her own consumption but also has a motive to transfer wealth to a donee, such as the warm glow of giving [Andreoni 1990] or altruism [Barro 1974 ]. 13 She trades off own consumption against transfers to a donee.
Assume a pre-reform situation in which a large number of donors faces a linear tax schedule T (b) = t b, where b are taxable transfers. Due to heterogeneity in preferences, taxable transfers are distributed according to the smooth density function h 0 (b). A tax reform introduces a convex kink in the tax schedule at the taxable transfer level b * at which the marginal tax rate increases from t to t 1 = t + ∆t. The kinked tax schedule reads
where 1(·) is an indicator variable for being above the cutoff. Let us denote by h(b) the corresponding density under this kinked budget set scenario.
The reform has the following consequences. Individuals with pre-reform transfers b ≤ b * are not affected by the change. We have h 0 (b) = h(b) for 12 In 2002, the mean individual net-of-debt wealth of the living population above the age of 17 years was 156,574 DM [Frick and Grabka 2009 ]. The 90th percentile was 407,757 DM. 13 The cross-sectional data neither allows us to study dynamics nor to analyze how individuals use gifts to avoid taxes. Therefore, the conceptual framework ignores dynamic accumulation of wealth across generations and does model the decision to give and to bequest jointly. b < b * . Donors who chose b > b * before the reform will reduce their wealth transmissions in response to the reform. Individuals who were initially located in the segment (b * , b * + ∆b * ] will bunch at the kink point b * , resulting in a spike in the density distribution. Note that ∆b * is the behavioral response of the individual who gave the highest pre-reform transfer among all bunchers, i.e., the marginal buncher.
What is fundamental to the agenda of this paper is that the transfer response of the marginal buncher ∆b * is related to the characteristics of the tax schedule and the elasticity of taxable transfers. Therefore, we can recover the elasticity if behavioral responses and tax system characteristics are known. To be precise, for infinitesimal values of ∆t and ∆b * , we can define the local compensated elasticity of taxable transfers with respect to the net-of-tax rate 1 − t at the kink
In equation (3), t, ∆t, and b * are known, while the transfer response ∆b * is not directly observable. However, ∆b * is associated with estimable quantities.
More precisely, as noted by Saez [2010] and Chetty et al. [2011] , the fraction of individuals who bunch at the kink is
where h 0 (a) is the average of h 0 (b) over the interval [b * , b * + ∆b * ]. 14 Given an estimate of the counterfactual density h 0 (b * ) at b * , the excess mass of taxpayers at the kink B/h 0 (b * ) approximates the marginal buncher's transfer response.
There are several points to note about elasticities estimated from equation
(3). First, the estimated elasticities reflect the behavioral responses of all involved actors (donor, donee) via all margins that affect the tax base (real response, non-real response). Second, when a donor transfers wealth to multiple donees and the tax is assessed at the level of the donee, then equation (3) does not identify the elasticity of the total taxable estate but identifies that of the individual taxable transfer. Third, for large values of ∆t, e is no longer a pure compensated elasticity but rather a mixture of the uncompensated and compen- 14 The second equality is derived from the mean value theorem of integral calculus. The approximation assumes a roughly constant counterfactual density h(b) on the bunching segment. sated elasticity. However, Bastani and Selin [2014] illustrate that the bias of the compensated elasticity is negligible even if tax rate changes are substantial, as in this paper. Fourth, if elasticities are heterogeneous across individuals, Saez [2010] shows that bunching is proportional to the average behavioral response E[∆b * ]. Then, we might estimate the average elasticity E[e] at b * .
The preceding analysis considers a setting with one convex kink only instead of a setting with multiple kinks, as implemented in Germany. That is because we do not observe significant behavioral responses to the concave kink point, most likely due to its minor salience. In Appendix A, we nevertheless develop a framework for nonparametrically identifying structural elasticities under salient double kinked tax schedules. 15
Approach to Estimate Behavioral Responses
Identifying behavioral responses and corresponding elasticities from bunching requires an estimate of the unobserved counterfactual distribution we would have observed had there not been a kinked tax schedule. We follow Chetty et al. [2011] and fit a polynomial to the empirical transfer distribution, excluding observations in a range around the convex kink. We then construct an estimate of the counterfactual as the predicted values from this regression. The key identifying assumption underlying this approach is that there should be no spike at the convex kink point in the unobserved counterfactual distribution.
A complication of identifying the counterfactual is that taxpayers tend to report taxable inheritances and taxable gifts in round numbers. Because the kinks are also located at salient round numbers, we would overestimate behavioral responses if we did not take round number bunching into account. Like Kleven and Waseem [2013] , we control for round number bunching at kinks by exploiting excess bunching at similar round numbers that are not kinks. However, in our case, the pattern of round number bunching changes along the taxable transfer distribution. Bunching at round numbers is strongest at the bottom of the distribution. Therefore, we allow for a flexible form of round number bunching.
The details of the empirical approach are as follows. Pooling taxable transfers 15 We find that elasticity formulas are unchanged if the marginal buncher at the convex kink point b * 1 does not jump the concave kink b * 2 (i.e., b * 1 + ∆b * 1 ≤ b * 2 ). In contrast, if the convex kink creates such powerful incentives that the marginal buncher comes from above the concave kink (i.e., b * 1 + ∆b * 1 > b * 2 ), then we have to modify the elasticity formula. The altered equation accounts for tax rate changes at both b * 1 and b * 2 . In our case, all estimates of b * 1 + ∆b * 1 lie far below the concave kink point. into bins i = {1, 2, . . . , B} using a bin width of 1,000 DM, we estimate a regression of the following form:
where n i is the fraction of taxable transfers that fall in bin i, z i is the taxable transfer level in bin i, and N is the set of natural numbers. The model includes a polynomial of order q 1 (first term), indicator variables for each bin in the range [L, U] around the considered convex kink point (second term), and interactions between a round number dummy for multiples of 10,000 DM and a polynomial of order q 2 (third term). 16 The estimated counterfactual distribution is the predicted values of (5), omitting the contribution of the dummies in the excluded ranges but not setting the round number dummies to zero:
The corresponding estimate of excess bunchingB is the difference between the observed and the counterfactual fraction of the population locating around the convex kink point:B = U i=L (n i −n i ). 17 Usingn i andB, we can determine the excess mass around the kink point relative to the average height of the counterfactual distribution aŝ
where N i is the number of bins in the excluded range. This measure translates to the behavioral response of the marginal buncher via the relationship ∆b * ≈ b × bin-wid th and, hence, is the relevant measure for the elasticity estimate.
Note thatb is not independent of the unit of measurement and varies with the choice of the bin width. 16 We select the polynomial orders case-by-case using a combination of the AI C, M SE, and R 2 . By including dummies for bins around the cutoff, we account for diffuse bunching.
17B tends to overestimate excess bunching if the empirical transfer distribution is positively skewed and higher tax rates above the kink trigger individuals to reduce transfers. That is because, in this case, the estimated counterfactual lies underneath the unobserved counterfactual. To address this bias, we shift the estimated counterfactual to the right of the convex kink upwards until the fraction of taxable transfers in the estimated counterfactual is equal to the fraction in the empirical distribution. See Chetty et al. [2011] for a more detailed description.
We calculate the standard error for ∆b * and e by applying a parametric residual bootstrap approach. Specifically, this bootstrap procedure generates a large set of transfer distributions and associated estimates by randomly resampling residuals. The standard error is then defined as the standard deviation of the distribution of the estimates. The following insights emerge from inspection of Figure 2 . First, Panel A illustrates that the overall density function is discontinuous and exhibits a spike at the 100,000 DM kink point that is significant at the 10% level (two-tailed confidence interval). This result provides the first evidence of behavioral responses to the tax schedule. The excess mass is remarkably sharp, suggesting that behavioral responses are very precise. Second, Panels B to D point at a pronounced heterogeneity across tax classes: we find noticeable bunching for close relatives that is significant at the 1% level but no significant bunching in the other two tax classes. There is a variety of competing explanations for the finding that the responses of closely related individuals are the most pronounced. Individuals might have an aversion against taxation of family property; for close relatives, jumps in marginal incentives at the convex kink are the most extreme; and tax evasion and tax avoidance might require coordination between the donor and the donee, which could be easier with close family. Third, turning to the concave kink points at the end of the shaded areas in Panels B to D, we find little evidence of holes in the distribution. 19 This might be explained by imperfect information on the location of the concave kink [Card et al. 2015] , high costs for individuals to process the information on the location of the kink [Sims 2003 , Schwartzstein 2014 ], or confusion of marginal and average tax rates [Liebman and Zeckhauser 2004] .
Let us now turn to the estimation of behavioral elasticities to evaluate the magnitude of the effects, combining the estimates of ∆b * with the elasticity formula (3). Part A of Table 2 ( When interpreting the elasticities, it is important to consider that these capture the behavioral responses of all involved actors (testators, heirs), including pre-death responses (real and non-real) and post-death responses of heirs, most likely in the form of misreporting (non-real). 20 From a positive perspective, two questions arise: first, notwithstanding the small size, we would like to know the 19 Visual inspection hints at a slight gap in the density around the concave kink for close relatives. However, the missing mass is not significantly different from other holes in the distribution occurring where incentives do not change. To test this, we extend regression (5) by including dummies for the missing mass region around the concave kink and dummies for placebo missing mass regions. We then use F -tests to test the equality of real and placebo missing mass. 20 Naturally, real responses and tax avoidance take place before death, and all post-death responses reflect the behavior of heirs. nature of the responses. Do we observe the consequences of decisions made long before death or, do we rather observe the post-death behavior of heirs? Second, we would like to get a better understanding of why elasticities are so small. As it turns out, we can make progress in answering both questions by comparing predefined inheritances and proportional inheritances. Figure 3 shows the empirical distribution of pure predefined inheritances, i.e., cases in which heirs solely inherit specific items of the estate. Panel B depicts the distribution of all other inheritances that at least partly consist of proportional inheritances. Parts B and C of Table 2 present the corresponding behavioral responses and elasticities.
Suggestive Evidence on the Anatomy of Responses Panel A in
All results rely on the close relatives sample.
For predefined inheritances, the behavioral response amounts to a precisely estimated value of 6,504 DM, implying a reduction of taxable inheritances by 6.5%. The corresponding elasticity to this large inheritance response is still moderate and takes a value of 0.11. The estimates are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. In sharp contrast, if proportional inheritances are involved, there are no statistically significant behavioral responses, and the elasticity is also close to zero and statistically insignificant. These findings, combined with the fact that 87% of transfers at death contain proportional inheritances, explain the overall small elasticities.
Turning to the nature of the response, Figure 3 suggests that behavioral responses reflect pre-death behavior. That is because if the response is of a postdeath nature, we should also find larger bunching of proportional inheritances. 21 Additional evidence buttresses the suggestion that the excess mass is not caused by underreporting. There are certain asset types that cannot be tracked by the tax administration and, hence, are especially prone to misreporting behavior. Those are all valuable items that are not deposited in any financial institution (e.g., cash, jewelry, precious metals), movables (e.g., cars, paintings, collections), and household inventory (e.g., household appliances, dishes). If bunching is indeed of a reporting nature, we expect heirs to misreport these assets so as to locate at 21 This interpretation is valid if the inheritance type is uncorrelated with the heirs' post-death behaviors. One possible concern is that the characteristics of family members are correlated so that predefined inheritance givers have heirs who misreport wealth. However, our results stay unchanged if we consider a sample in which each testator leaves both predefined and proportional inheritances (see Figure A4 in the Appendix). Another concern is that an heir's ability to respond to taxes is correlated with the inheritance type. But because identical rules apply to proportional and predefined inheritances, the opportunities to respond should be the same. the kink point. We do not find any evidence in favor of this hypothesis using the pure predefined inheritance sample: only 0.9% of all predefined inheritances cases contain self-reported items. Therefore, heirs may already choose the corner solution of full evasion of self-reported items. The increase in the tax rate at the kink point then cannot trigger any additional misreporting response. Or, individuals possess no self-reported items at all so that misreporting in response to the tax rate change is impossible.
Given that responses seem to be of a pre-death nature, a natural explanation for the concentration of responses on predefined inheritances is that these involve less uncertainty than proportional inheritances. When bequeathing claims to certain assets of the estate, testators decide on the particular asset allocation before they die. Thus, the value of the transfer is certain and, as a result, plannable. Testators are capable to precisely react to the incentives provided by the tax schedule. The sharpness of bunching indeed shows that behavioral responses are very accurate. In contrast, responding to taxes via the proportional inheritance channel is more difficult. The value of the transfer depends on the total estate at death, and when the length of the lifetime is uncertain, then proportional inheritances are at least partly accidental at the intensive margin. Thus, proportional inheritance givers are likely incapable of responding to taxation, as predicted by accidental bequest models [Yaari 1965 , Hurd 1989 , Friedman and Warshawsky 1990 , Mitchell et al. 1999 , Kopczuk 2013 . 22 This may explain why overall elasticities are so small.
Results for Inter Vivos Gifts
Overall Responses This section presents the results for inter vivos gifts. Because gifts do not involve uncertainty about the transfer, provide tax avoidance opportunities, and are less strongly enforced than inheritances, we expect to observe larger bunching of taxable inter vivos gifts than of taxable inheritances. Figure 4 presents the empirical distributions. Part A of Table 2 (columns 4-5) reports the corresponding behavioral responses and elasticity estimates. The pooled distribution of taxable inter vivos gifts features a large excess mass that is significant at the 1% level. Again, bunching is extremely sharp. The findings regarding the heterogeneity across tax classes are similar to those for inheritances.
We document large bunching for close relatives that is significant at the 1% level, somewhat smaller bunching for other relatives that is significant at the 5% level, and no statistically significant bunching for unrelated individuals. 23 Considering close relatives, excess mass transforms into large behavioral responses but moderate elasticities: the marginal buncher reduces inter vivos gifts by 4,406 DM, resulting in an elasticity of 0.07. The gift response for other relatives is 1,400 DM, and the corresponding elasticity takes a value of 0.02. We conclude that gifts are indeed more elastic than inheritances.
Conclusion
According to economic theory, individuals should bunch at convex kink points if they have convex preferences that are smoothly distributed in the population. This paper is the first to examine bunching at wealth transfer tax kinks, considering the German inheritance and gift tax. The substantial size of the kinks and the fact that they apply to very prosperous individuals render the setting particularly valuable. Our key finding is that although bunching of taxable inheritances and taxable inter vivos gifts is large in some subsamples, the underlying behavioral elasticities are moderate. We conclude that wealth transfers are relatively inelastic along the intensive margin in the short term.
In this paper, we have made a step toward pinning down the magnitude of short-run elasticities. However, in the long term individuals have more time to adjust taxable transfers, and they have additional opportunities to respond to tax incentives. The long-run elasticities are thus likely to be larger. In the same vein, our analysis is limited to examining responses to marginal tax rates at death rather than to incentives over the lifetime. This also precludes the study of longterm responses. Further, we recover the elasticity of taxable inheritances instead of the elasticity of the total taxable estate, which should be larger. For these reasons, we cannot conclude that the overall long-run elasticity is necessarily small in Germany. Future studies on behavioral responses to wealth transfer taxation should, therefore, aim at studying the long-term responses of the total estate. A particularly important subtopic is exploring the nature of the responses, as different types of responses lead to alternative conclusions [Saez et al. 2012] . 23 There is no visual evidence of a hole in the density around the concave kink. Particularly, for close relatives, for whom we find the largest excess mass, we do not observe missing mass in the distribution. This makes us confident that individuals are not responding to the concave kink. 
We have α i = 0 for inter vivos gifts. Proportion of the estate in %. All other values in 1,000 DM. Within each tax bracket the tax liability is a percentage of the taxable transfer, creating a notch at the bracket cutoff (see dashed black line). The tax code smooths the transition between tax brackets and replaces the notch in the tax liability with two kinks (see dashed blue line). Panel B shows the underlying jumps in the marginal tax rates by plotting tax rates as a function of the taxable transfer. Tax rates depend on the donor-donee relationship. For close relatives, the marginal tax rate increases from 7% to 50% and subsequently falls to 11%. The corresponding values for other relatives (unrelated individuals) are 12%, 50%, and 17% (17%, 50%, and 23%). The figure also shows the change in the marginal tax rate at the convex kink in percentage points ∆t = t 1 − t (see box). The jumps are substantial and most pronounced for close relatives. The panels also include the estimated counterfactual distributions (dashed black lines). We obtain these counterfactuals by fitting q 1 -order polynomial regressions on the binned data, including the interactions between a round number dummy and polynomials of order q 2 , and excluding the data around the convex kink point (see equation (6)). We choose q 1 = 7 and q 2 = 5 for Panels A and D, q 1 = 2 and q 2 = 3 for Panel B, and q 1 = 4 and q 2 = 5 for Panel C.b is the excess mass around the convex kink point relative to the average density of the counterfactual distribution (see equation (7)). We derive standard errors using a bootstrap procedure. . We obtain these counterfactuals by fitting 2nd-order polynomial regressions on the binned data, including the interactions between a round number dummy and polynomials of order 3, and excluding the data around the convex kink point (see equation (6)).b is the excess mass around the convex kink point relative to the average density of the counterfactual distribution (see equation (7)). We derive standard errors using a bootstrap procedure. . We obtain these counterfactuals by fitting q 1 -order polynomial regressions on the binned data, including the interactions between a round number dummy and polynomials of order q 2 , and excluding the data around the convex kink point (see equation (6)). We choose q 1 = 7 and q 2 = 5 for Panels A and D, q 1 = 2 and q 2 = 3 for Panel B, and q 1 = 4 and q 2 = 5 for Panel C.b is the excess mass around the convex kink point relative to the average density of the counterfactual distribution (see equation (7)). We derive standard errors using a bootstrap procedure.
A A Structural Model of Behavioral Responses
The analysis in section 3 considers the case with only one convex kink. Subsequently, we show if and how multiple kinks affect elasticities. For that purpose, we need to impose further assumptions on the structure of a donor's preferences.
We proceed in two steps. First, we set up a simple structural model and consider a single kink setting. Second, we extend the analysis to a double kinked schedule.
A.1 Single Kink Setting
In the following, we build on the seminal joy of giving model of Andreoni [1990] that has been the standard choice for investigating the consequences of wealth transfer taxes when focusing on decisions of donors only [e.g., De Nardi 2004 , De Nardi et al. 2010 , Ameriks et al. 2011 , Lockwood 2014 .
Each donor maximizes the quasi-linear and iso-elastic utility function 
Assuming that the strength of warm glow ρ is smoothly distributed in the population, it is straightforward to show that donors who locate in the segment (b * 1 , b * 1 + ∆b * 1 ] before the reform bunch at b * afterward. Given the structure of the preferences, we can derive a structural form equivalent to the reduced form elasticity formula (3). For this purpose, consider the marginal buncher who has ρ * + ∆ρ * ≡ b * (1 − t)(1 − t − ∆t) − . This warm glow type is located at b * + ∆b * = (ρ * + ∆ρ * )(1 − t) −1 before the reform. After inserting ρ * + ∆ρ * into b * + ∆b * , we can rearrange terms so as to obtain the elasticity locally at b * :
While t, ∆t, and b * are known, we can estimate ∆b * as described in section 3.
Therefore, the reduced form elasticity (3) and the structural form elasticity (9) are approximately the same size if the behavioral response is small relative to the threshold. Table A3 in the Appendix reports elasticities estimated according to equation (9).
A.2 Multiple Kink Setting
Consider an alternative tax reform that introduces two discrete changes in the marginal tax rate. First, there is a convex kink at b * 1 , where the marginal tax rate increases from t to t + ∆t 1 . Second, there is a concave kink at b * 2 at which the marginal tax rate decreases from t + ∆t 1 to t + ∆t 2 . In the plateau area (b * 1 , b * 2 ], the marginal tax rate remains at the substantially higher level t + ∆t 1 . The complete schedule reads
where 1(·) are indicator variables. The reform has the following consequences: individuals with pre-reform transfers b ∈ (b * 1 , b * 1 +∆b * 1 ] will bunch at the convex kink point b * 1 . Furthermore, the concave kink creates a region of dominated choice [b * 2 − ∆b * 2− , b * 2 + ∆b * 2+ ) in which no individual is willing to locate as long as the utility function is differentiable. There are two different cases. The tax-reform does not influence transfers of this individual; she selects b * 1 both before and after the tax reform. In contrast, donors with pre-reform transfers b > b * 1 reduce wealth transfers. The marginal buncher H chooses the highest pre-reform transfer b * 1 +∆b * 1 (perceives the highest joy of giving ρ * 1 + ∆ρ * 1 ) amongst those who locate at b * 1 after the reform. Because this individual locates below b * 2 before the reform, she solely reacts to the tax rate change at b * 1 ; she behaves as if there is only one convex kink and lowers transfers by ∆b * 1 . The marginal spreader I chooses the lowest post-reform transfer b * 2 + ∆b * 2+ (perceives the lowest joy of giving ρ I ) amongst those who locate above b * 2 . This individual is the lowest joy of giving type who reacts to the shift at b * 2 ; precisely, her behavioral reaction to the tax rate change at b * 2 is ∆b * 2− + ∆b * 2+ . This follows from the fact that I is indifferent between an interior point on the plateau b * 2 − ∆b * 2− and an interior point in the top bracket b * 2 + ∆b * 2+ . In a nutshell, every individual with ρ ≤ ρ * 1 is unaffected by the tax reform; all individuals with ρ ∈ (ρ * 1 , ρ * 1 + ∆ρ * 1 ] bunch at the kink; individuals with ρ ∈ (ρ * 1 + ∆ρ * 1 , ρ I ) locate on the plateau, and individuals with ρ ≥ ρ I prefer interior solutions in the top bracket. The reform is not affecting the density to the left of b * 1 ; there is a spike in the density distribution at b * 1 ; and there is a hole in the density distribution in the range
Case 2: Concave Kink Inside Bunching Segment If the concave kink lies instead in the bunching segment of the convex kink b * 2 ∈ (b * 1 , b * 1 + ∆b * 1 ], the incentives created by the tax schedule are so powerful that the marginal buncher is coming from above the concave kink. In this case, we need to modify the elasticity formula so that it accounts for tax rate changes at both kink points b * 1 and b * 2 . Figure 6 illustrates this second scenario. As apparent from Panel A, the marginal buncher H, who choose pre-reform transfers b * 1 + ∆b * 1 ≥ b * 2 , is indifferent between bunching at the convex kink point b * 1 and locating at an interior point b * 2 + ∆b * 2+ after the reform. As a result, individuals with ρ > ρ * 1 + ∆ρ * 1 choose interior solutions above b * 2 and no single individual locates in the plateau area. This is reflected in the density distribution: once again, there is bunching at b * 1 and a density hole surrounding b * 2 , but the region of dominated choice ranges from b * 1 to b * 2 + ∆b * 2+ and fully includes the plateau (b * 1 , b * 2 ]. To derive the modified elasticity formula, we exploit that the marginal buncher who has ρ * 1 + ∆ρ * 1 is indifferent between the kink point b * 1 and her best interior solution b * 2 + ∆b * 2+ . At the kink point b * 1 her utility level is
In contrast, at b * 2 + ∆b * 2+ she obtains utility
Noting that the marginal buncher locates at b * + ∆b * = (ρ * + ∆ρ * )(1 − t) −1 before the reform and using the equality u K = u I , we can rearrange terms so as to obtain
This equation specifies the relationship between the elasticity , and tax schedule characteristics. To recover , we can solve equation (11) numerically given the known tax schedule characteristics and an estimate of the transfer response ∆b * 1 . Equation (11) nests the case where the marginal buncher is coming from below the concave kink. To see this, note that when the marginal buncher is only reacting to the first and not to the second tax rate change (∆t 2 = ∆t 1 ), equation (11) simplifies to
By inserting elasticity formula (9) into (12), the right hand side becomes zero.
Therefore, (9) is the solution to equation (11) for ∆t 2 = ∆t 1 . 
B Tables
where α i is heir i's share of the estate net-of-debt. A testator might leave a proportion of E−D to i (proportional inheritance) and/or bequests specific assets or liabilities to i (predefined inheritance). In general, testators are able to allocate every asset or liability that is part of the estate to specific donees. For inter vivos gifts, we have α i = 0. ♣ marks self-reported assets. 
Notes:
The table summarizes responses of taxable inheritances and taxable inter vivos gifts to wealth transfer kinks depending on the donor-donee relationship. It contains the changes in the marginal tax rates at the convex kink point ∆t = t 1 − t, estimated responses to kinks in DM ∆b * , and structural elasticities . Part A presents overall responses; Part B focuses on predefined inheritances; Part C concentrates on inheritances that at least partly consist of proportional inheritances. See Table A2 Notes: Pooling the data across tax classes, Panel A shows the empirical distribution of taxable inheritances and Panel B the distribution of taxable inter vivos gifts for the first two tax bracket (bin width 5,000 DM). Panel C and D zoom in on the distributions around the 100,000 DM cutoff (bin width 2,000 DM). The panels in the second row also include smooth distribution estimates obtained using local linear regressions on the binned data (solid black lines). The underlying local linear regressions allow for jumps at the cutoff, include 3rd-order polynomials, and use triangle kernels. The dashed black lines represent 95% confidence bands. The vertical red lines mark the 100,000 DM kink point. 
